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Abstract 
One of the intentions of the Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
was to use markets to allow the developed countries to supplement their own greenhouse 
gas reduction efforts with carbon reductions made in developing countries by purchasing 
carbon offsets. By these means, it was hoped, global greenhouse gas emissions would be 
reduced and developing countries would benefit through incoming carbon revenue and 
technology transfer. This has worked for China and India, which together account for 88% 
of all CDM carbon credits issued so far, but it hasn’t worked for Africa which has only a 
miserly 1% of the issued credits. The main reasons for this disparity are thought to be the 
high transaction costs of the CDM and the long and complicated registration, validation, 
monitoring and verification processes. The costs are around R400 000 to R2 000 000 per 
project (CCWG, 2009) .  In addition it can take up to three years to get carbon revenue, if 
the project is one of the lucky 13% of projects to make it through to the end (see 
Appendix A – CDM Pipeline analysis). Partly in response to these CDM shortcomings, the 
voluntary carbon market has emerged. The voluntary carbon market has many players 
using many different standards and rules and regulations. Unfortunately, the CDM-like 
standards used by the bigger voluntary carbon market registries also incur high 
transaction costs and long lead times and therefore don’t work for typical, small African 
poverty alleviation projects with low greenhouse gas emission reduction potential. This has 
encouraged the development of small, agile carbon registries using simplified standards, 
                                                        
1 This study is part of Peter Atkins’ Master’s dissertation at the UCT Energy Research Centre. 
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which better fit the African projects. One such small registry and one of its poverty 
alleviation projects are analysed in this paper. 
Introduction 
The problem  
Poverty alleviation projects in developing countries can attract additional funding if they 
can prove that they reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This funding comes from the 
carbon offset market – where countries, businesses or individuals buy carbon reduction 
credits from others in order to reduce their own carbon footprints more cost -effectively. 
However, there are many barriers to be overcome before the carbon credit revenue starts 
flowing to the projects. 
One barrier is that of scale. Many projects addressing poverty in developing countries do 
not generate enough carbon revenue to afford the high transaction costs incurred in the 
mainline carbon markets – these costs are at least R400 000 per project initially (CCWG, 
2009). Also, small projects often do not satisfy the mainline carbon market rules and 
conditions. Finally, the whole screening and approval process is often too long for most 
small projects which don’t have large capital reserves and need the carbon revenue quickly. 
The background 
The carbon market can be split into two broad categories: the compliance market, 
governed by the Kyoto Protocol, and the voluntary market which is unregulated. The 
compliance market is currently dominated by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 
whilst the main players in the voluntary carbon market (where companies and individuals 
choose to buy carbon offsets voluntarily), are the registries using the Gold Standard (GS) 
and the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS). However, the GS and VCS registration and audit 
processes also incur high transaction costs and long lead times for registration and the 
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issuance and sale of carbon credits. Because of these CDM-like problems with the large 
registries, the voluntary market has opened up to smaller, more agile participants.    
 
Responding to the needs of small projects, innovative carbon entrepreneurs have set up 
voluntary carbon registries using simple but effective standards for ensuring good quality 
carbon credits, whilst radically lowering the transaction costs (by an order of magnitude or 
more) and producing carbon revenue quickly, in months rather than years. Surprisingly, 
the recent carbon prices achieved in the small voluntary carbon market are comparable to 
the CDM, GS and VCS prices. 
The purpose and rationale 
This paper will describe the process of how a poor community in Umdoni, Kwazulu Natal 
(KZN) South Africa achieved GHG reductions and converted these into carbon revenues and 
then recycled the bulk of the revenue back into their community. A voluntary carbon 
registry, specialising in poverty alleviation projects, assisted the community with auditing, 
registering and selling the carbon credits. The project, Umdoni Gel Stoves, is a ‘fuel-
switching’ project which makes use of bioethanol gel supplied under the South African 
Government’s Free Basic Alternative Energy (FBAE) policy, and using gel stoves supplied 
by donors and local government (DME, 2007). 
 
The project enables poor households to partially displace wood, paraffin and dung fuel 
sources with cleaner-burning bioethanol gel (a by-product of the local sugarcane industry). 
This results in:  
• reduced paraffin fire threat and indoor air pollution 
• less time spent collecting firewood 
• reduced household expenditure on energy 
• conservation of dung on croplands with the associated improved soil fertility 
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• creation of sustainable village businesses selling and distributing the bioethanol gel 
• reduced GHG emissions 
The bulk of the carbon revenue (70%) goes back to the community and is being used in 
ways determined by them. The remainder of the revenue covers project management and 
carbon registry fees. 
Literature Review 
Why the carbon market is important in sub-Saharan Africa 
The carbon market is important to sub-Saharan Africa for many reasons. It incentivises 
GHG reductions through carbon credits which can then be sold. It helps carbon revenue-
supported projects to get off the ground and be sustainable. These projects generally 
deliver community benefits and contribute to most of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs); such as poverty alleviation, education and the empowerment of women through 
less fuel gathering and improvement of home conditions, healthy homes through 
interventions such as air pollution reduction and water purification. In addition, if the 
project is partially funded from foreign sources and uses imported technology, it may result 
in an inflow of foreign capital and technology transfer. 
How the carbon market works 
The carbon market came into being through the Kyoto Protocol under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) was set up as a market instrument to encourage and help the developed nations to 
reduce their GHG emissions in the most cost-effective way while benefitting the developing 
countries through ‘clean development’ projects. The developed nations who were 
signatories to the Kyoto Protocol, known as Annex 1 countries, have committed to reducing 
their GHG emissions in whatever way they can. Recognising that because GHG emissions 
diffuse throughout the atmosphere quickly (in a matter of days), it doesn’t matter where in 
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the world the GHG reductions are achieved. Therefore, the CDM argument goes, if an 
Annex 1 country is having trouble reducing its own emissions then it makes sense to allow 
it to pay a developing country to make some GHG reductions in its stead if that happens to 
be more cost-effective. At the same time the developing country can benefit from GHG-
reducing projects. This is known as offsetting one’s carbon footprint by buying carbon 
credits and retiring them. This market is known as the compliance market because players 
are in this market in order to comply with Kyoto Protocol commitments. (UNFCCC-CDM, 
2012) 
How the compliance market works 
The CDM Registry acts as a type of stock market for GHG emission reductions, called 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs; where 1 CER is 1 metric tonne of carbon dioxide 
equivalent, abbreviated to tCO2e. GHGs consist of many different gases, such as carbon 
dioxide, methane etc. so it is customary to measure the global warming potential of GHGs in 
terms of the equivalent tonnes of carbon dioxide). The CDM Executive Board (CDM EB) acts 
as the auditor or gatekeeper and ensures that the CERs are real, quantifiable, permanent 
and additional. This is to avoid CERs being issued and sold and then discovering that the 
project that was supposed to generate the CERs either never started or failed after a while. 
Or that the project would have happened anyway – this is where ‘additionality’ comes in – 
the project is only valid if its CERs are addition to business as usual. 
CDM rules and processes 
In an attempt to make sure that a project’s CERs are valid, a complex set of standards and 
procedures has been set up.  
The methods to be used for GHG reduction calculations are defined by the CDM 
Methodologies (CDM_Rulebook, n.d.). The list of methodologies is long but finite, whereas 
just about every project is different; so one always has to exercise judgment as to which 
methodology to use for a particular project.  
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The CDM processes are long and complex and require the services of accredited experts to 
ensure compliance: this is what causes the high transaction costs and lengthy lead times as 
described on page 1. For many projects, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, this is just too 
expensive, too risky and takes too long and this is where the voluntary market provides an 
alternative to the CDM. 
The voluntary carbon market 
As its name implies, the voluntary carbon market allows companies, communities and 
individuals to generate and trade carbon credits voluntarily. Generally carbon credits in the 
voluntary carbon market are called Verified Carbon Credits (VERs) and each VER is 
equivalent to 1 tCO2e.  
VERs are purchased for a variety of reasons such as: ethical reasons, corporate social 
responsibility commitments, public relations or ‘green-washing’, attempting to pre-empt 
GHG emission regulation and many more.  Voluntary carbon projects usually have low GHG 
reduction potential and so the carbon revenue benefits are small compared to the projects’ 
other benefits. These projects are usually designed to deliver poverty alleviation or social 
development and the VER revenue is often a small side benefit – useful but not essential to 
the project’s viability. 
Voluntary carbon market players – Type 1 and Type 2 
The voluntary market can be categorised into two parts: the big players using CDM-like 
standards and processes (which we will call Type 1) and the rest (which we will call 
Type 2) which use simpler processes and a variety of standards. 
Type 1 carbon registries 
Type 1 markets are characterised by strong additionality requirements, long delays before 
carbon revenues start flowing, and participating projects which achieve relatively high GHG 
reductions in relation to the costs of the project and the community benefits delivered. 
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Examples of the Type 1 standards are the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) and the Gold 
Standard (GS) (The Gold Standard Foundation, 2012; VCS, 2012). Both these standards 
differ from the CDM in that they focus more strongly on developmental objectives and 
outcomes than does the CDM.  Because the VCS and GS are as complex and comprehensive 
as the CDM in terms of standards and processes, they suffer from similar problems of high 
transaction costs and long delays before issuance and revenue flow.  
These shortcomings opened the doors for smaller, innovative carbon registries with 
simplified standards and processes to enter the market – these are the Type 2 registries. 
Type 2 carbon registries 
Type 2 markets, whilst also having strict GHG emissions reduction additionality 
requirements, do not require financial additionality and because the carbon revenues are 
low, will usually require additional external funding. Their simpler acceptance criteria and 
on-going audit processes result in faster approvals and early starts to carbon revenue 
flows; which are essential to the viability of most small projects. Often, the approval and 
auditing processes can be done by local agencies instead of having to call in accredited 
overseas consultants (such as DOEs) at great expense. The projects in Type 2 markets also 
tend to deliver significant social benefits compared to their GHG reduction potential. 
Examples of Type 2 market registries are small, voluntary carbon registries such as 
Credible Carbon/PACE (Cartwright, 2012) and Climate Care (ClimateCare, 2012).  
The next step in analysing the best route to generating carbon revenue for a project is to 
consider the causes of market failures and market successes of the CDM compliance 
market. 
Where the Compliance market succeeds and where it has failed 
The Compliance market and the voluntary carbon market and Type 1 and Type 2 markets 
overlap and sometimes compete with each other and at other times complement each 
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other. They each have their own advantages and disadvantages and succeed in some 
circumstances and fail in others. 
The CDM Compliance market has had the greatest penetration in China and India, both in 
terms of the number of projects and the scale of CERs generated and issued. This can be 
seen in Figure 1 below. The total CERs registered for China and India amounts to 75% as at 
July 2012, with Africa only getting 3% of the global CDM pie. The situation gets worse when 
the issued CERs are compared (issued CERs are ready to be sold, whereas registered CERs 
still have to be audited and verified); then China and India account for 88% and Africa 
only 1% of issued CERs. 
 
Figure 1 Comparison of quantity by country – in terms of CERs registered and issued  
(Source: (Fenhann, 2012) and author’s analysis in Appendix A) 
This demonstrates that the CDM has had high penetration in China and India, but not in 
Africa.  
Problems with CDM penetration in Africa 
There are several reasons for this disparity between China/India and Africa CDM success; 
such as population size, technological sophistication, the degree of industrialisation, 
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government involvement and general institutional capacity. China scores high on all of 
these factors while Africa scores low. However, it can be argued that the key factor 
hindering African projects is that they are generally small with a low GHG reduction 
potential so they simply can’t afford the high CDM costs. For instance, African projects such 
as replacing traditional three-stone fires with efficient woodstoves only generate one or 
two CERs per household per year. Whereas in China, especially in the early days of CDM, 
there were many huge, industrial projects which simply had to flare or burn exhaust gases 
instead of venting them to the atmosphere, resulting in tens of thousands of CERs per year.  
Low GHG reductions and high transaction costs 
The problem with low-intensity GHG reduction projects is that the transaction costs per 
project remain high whilst the CER yields are low. For a project just to break-even, that is 
generate enough CER revenue to pay for the registration, verification, monitoring and 
validation costs, it has to generate about 5 000 to 10 000 CERs depending on the carbon 
prices (which are currently around R50 to R100 per CER).  
Long delays and high risk of failure in the CDM processes 
Other problems with the CDM generally are the long delays from application to the final 
issuance and sale of the CERs and the low success ratios as described on page 1: Delays of 
up to three years and a success rate of 13% globally (Appendix A – CDM Pipeline analysis).  
GHG reduction versus meeting development objectives 
After all this, CDM projects do not always fit in with African government priorities, which 
tend to be more about development and meeting Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
than helping the Annex 1 countries reduce their carbon emissions. Although the CDM is 
supposed to promote development in the project-hosting countries, in practice the CDM 
criteria are aimed at GHG reductions. 
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Addressing the CDM failure in Africa 
Naturally, these problems with CDM have been noted and the CDM is actively trying to 
address them. The key attempts have been: allowing multiple, similar projects to be 
grouped together and treated as one in order to reduce the costs, introducing new 
methodologies suitable for small projects and loan finance to cover the CDM costs,  
While these measures will probably help, it is too early to see if they will turn the tide in 
favour of African CDM projects. As mentioned previously, faced with these CDM problems,  
projects have turned to the voluntary markets. However, in an attempt to improve 
credibility, some of the voluntary market players have adopted CDM-like processes and 
standards, resulting in similar problems of high costs and long delays as will be shown 
below. 
The voluntary carbon markets 
The voluntary carbon markets can be classified into Type 1 markets (as described on page 
8) which are very much CDM-based, and Type 2 markets, which are aimed at smaller 
projects with low unit GHG reduction potential and with a strong developmental 
component. 
Type 1 voluntary carbon markets (GS and VCS for example) 
Whilst these do address the requirement for developmental outcomes, they still suffer from 
high transaction costs and long delays. This is for the same reasons that apply to the CDM.  
Therefore, at present, there is still a market niche for the Type 2 voluntary market players. 
Type 2 voluntary markets (for example, Credible Carbon/PACE and ClimateCare) 
This paper will concentrate on Credible Carbon/PACE, which is similar to ClimateCare 
although much smaller; details of ClimateCare can be obtained from their comprehensive 
web site (ClimateCare, 2012). Typical voluntary carbon markets involve more participants 
than just the carbon registry and carbon auditors. 
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Before looking at why particular registries work well with Type 2 projects, it is necessary 
firstly to explore how the Type 2 carbon projects work – who gets involved and how and 
what are the various roles and role-players. 
Typically Type 2 projects are not motivated primarily by GHG emissions reductions, but 
rather by the need to deliver tangible community benefits; such as: poverty alleviation, 
health improvements, and energy provision. These needs are well-defined and motivated 
for in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
These projects tend to be created in response to a community need. There will always be a 
‘champion’ or project conceiver who has the vision of what the project should deliver and 
has the skills and the drive and the connections to make it happen. This person could be a 
member of the community itself, or someone in a non-government organisation (NGO), or 
sometimes a local government person, or perhaps a funding organisation looking for 
suitable projects.  
The necessary role-players are: 
• Community representatives 
• Project Proponent 
• Project Developer 
• Local Government representatives 
• Funders 
• Carbon registry, carbon auditor and carbon offset customers 
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It is worth looking at these in more detail in order to get to grips with typical Type 2 
project dynamics.
 
Figure 2 Typical voluntary carbon project participants 
Community representatives 
As with all projects, in whatever domain, one of the prerequisites for success is to ensure 
that the project will deliver what the proposed beneficiaries want (not necessarily ‘need’). 
So one of the first actions should be to find out what the community wants. This is usually 
done by identifying legitimate community representatives who will act on behalf of the 
community and, hopefully, interpret the wants (and perhaps needs as well) accurately and 
commit the community to the project and its success. The project developer, as described 
below, will often assist in the wants/needs analysis by collecting data and analysing it: but 
the community representatives should have the final say as to what the community wants 
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Project Proponent 
The project proponent plays the role of ‘deal-maker’, much like the producer in the movie 
business. This involves working with the community representatives and the local 
government, appointing a suitable project developer, finding a funder and arranging 
funding and the carbon finance side of things with an appropriate carbon registry. The 
project proponent is also responsible for checking that the project has been implemented 
as planned, and, once running, is delivering the promised outcomes. One of the outcomes of 
a carbon project is, of course achieving the predicted GHG reductions. This is based on an 
agreed GHG reduction calculation (called a ‘methodology’ as in the CDM nomenclature) and 
a monitoring plan.  
Project Developer 
The project developer does the actual, hands-on work of developing the project plan and 
implementing the project as planned. 
Local Government representatives 
Generally, any community project will need to get the buy-in and possibly statutory 
permissions from its local government. This is done through a local government 
representative who will make sure that the project doesn’t contravene any rules and 
regulations. Sometimes the local government can also be a source of funding and expertise. 
Funder 
Most Type 2 projects cannot survive on the carbon revenue alone and so additional funding 
is required. This is the role of the funder – to provide the agreed funding. The funder will 
mainly work with the Project Proponent. The funder will typically need to be involved 
during the project planning and implementation as well as once the project is up and 
running. Most funders will require detailed project documentation before and during the 
project implementation and regular audit reports once the project is running. 
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Carbon registry, carbon auditor and carbon offset customers 
The carbon registry is responsible for registering the audited carbon reductions in the form 
of Verified Emission Reductions (VERs), based on the agreed carbon reduction 
methodology, and then marketing and selling the VERs to their customers. 
The carbon registry appoints an independent carbon auditor who will verify that the 
project’s VER projections are using the agreed methodologies. The auditor should be 
objective and independent of all the other project participants, have the required carbon 
auditing skills and be credible in the eyes of the carbon offset customers.  Once the project 
is running, monitoring (by the project proponent) and periodic audits (by an appointed 
carbon auditor) have to be carried out. 
The carbon offset customers can be any individuals or any business entities who need or 
want to offset their carbon footprints. Their reasons for buying carbon offsets could 
include: an ethical desire to reduce their carbon footprint, a corporate requirement to do 
so, a legal requirement, or to meet a commercial objective (such as reducing carbon tax 
cost-effectively). So, those are the players, now for the game. 
A typical Type 2 project life-cycle 
Naturally all projects are different and events unfold in many ways. In the real world, 
projects are always rather messy and they evolve rather than progress in a neat, orderly 
way. However process usually includes these steps: 
• A community need arises or springs into prominence 
• A ‘champion’ emerges and decides to do something about the community need 
• The hero might be a member of the community, part of an NGO, a local government 
official, a project proponent, project developer, funder or a carbon registry looking 
for projects 
• The hero finds a project proponent to run with the project 
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• The project proponent engages with the community through community 
representatives to establish and formalise the community needs and define a 
suitable project to meet some or all of the needs 
• The project proponent produces a Project Idea Note (PIN) which defines the project 
aims and scope – this document is similar to the CDM PIN 
• Once the PIN has been endorsed by the community, the project proponent then 
assembles the other project players: the project developer, a local government 
representative, the NGO representative (if there is an NGO involved) and possibly a 
funder 
• The project proponent , with the project developer,  then prepares a Project 
Definition Document (PDD), based on the PIN, which spells out the project details, 
including the promised deliverables (community benefits, GHG reduction 
methodology, GHG baseline analysis, GHG reduction calculations, costs, timing) 
• The project proponent then ensures that the PDD is acceptable to the project 
stakeholders: the community, the project developer, the involved NGO if there is 
one, the local government representative, the carbon registry and the funder (if a 
funder has already been engaged) 
• The project proponent now attempts to secure funding for the project (this is in 
addition to the carbon revenue that should be generated by the project); at this 
stage the funder might wish to negotiate the project scope and deliverables and 
make changes to the PDD 
• Once all the role players are happy with the funding proposal and any changes to the 
PDD, the project proponent will prepare the necessary contracts (which formalise 
who does what, and most importantly, who will own the carbon credits) 
• The project now goes ahead under the control of the project developer and normal 
project management processes are followed; the project proponent will usually also 
have an oversight role during the implementation 
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• Once the project has been completed to the satisfaction of all the role players, it 
moves into the monitoring phase 
• The on-going monitoring of the project is arranged by the project proponent 
• A regular audit of the project deliverables is carried out by the appointed auditor as 
per the project contracts 
• Once the GHG reductions for a particular year (vintage) have been successfully 
audited, they are registered on the carbon registry as VERs and the carbon registry 
starts marketing the VERs to potential customers (carbon offset buyers) 
• Carbon offset buyers can either buy VERs and retire them immediately, in which 
case the retired VERs can be used as offsets, or they can keep them to resell or retire 
later 
As can be seen, the project process is quite complicated and can become extremely 
bureaucratic and expensive as has happened with the Type 1 project processes, which are 
even more complicated and require more documentation and accredited experts to 
produce the documentation. 
The secret of successful Type 2 projects is to keep the whole process as simple as possible 
consistent with maintaining quality and credibility, so as to keep the project transaction 
costs down. The next point of interest is the functioning of voluntary carbon registries. 
How does a carbon registry work? 
A carbon registry is like a financial stock exchange in that it puts sellers and buyers 
together and allows them to carry out buying and selling transactions and tracks who owns 
which VERs and which VERs have been retired by whom. Each sale of VERs is identified by 
a unique transaction code in the registry so that the life cycle of a particular VER block can 
be tracked – this history includes: which project it originated from and when, who sold it 
and when, who bought it and when, and who retired it and when. In addition, a carbon 
registry does a number of other things, the foremost being that it guarantees that the VERs 
it has registered conform to a set of standards. These standards should be open to the 
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public. The registry also has access to the project documentation (PIN, PDD and audit 
reports) and can make these available to legitimate, interested parties, such as potential 
VER buyers. Generally the registry will issue retirement certificates so that an offset 
customer has evidence of the VERs that have been retired and are eligible for offset 
purposes. 
A successful carbon registry will carry a reasonable stock of audited VERs covering a range 
of projects and will have a track record of selling VERs at competitive prices to a range of 
buyers – the quality of the VER-generating projects and the legitimacy of the VER auditing 
will contribute to the price that its VERs will command. The efficiency of the registry’s 
carbon auditing processes will determine the cost to the project of registering and verifying 
its VERs. The VER selling price less the registry costs determines the net carbon revenue 
available to the project stake holders.  
There are many voluntary carbon registries using various standards, and rather than 
attempting to cover them all, this paper will look at Credible Carbon (a Type 2 voluntary 
carbon registry) and its allied project proponent entity, PACE (standing for Promotion of 
Access to Carbon Equity) and a particular project, Umdoni Gel Stoves. 
Credible Carbon and PACE 
The Credible Carbon and PACE standards and guiding principles are simple and are 
reasonably easy to implement in the real world. Credible Carbon projects must conform to 
the following conditions: The projects must be real and up and running, they must reduce 
GHGs and contribute to poverty alleviation, 70% of the carbon revenue after audit fees 
must be returned to the project community, the projects must be situated in sub-Saharan 
Africa and be locally developed, the proportion of carbon sequestration projects, such as 
tree-planting must be less than 25% (because of the inherent unpredictability of forestry 
projects), and lastly, the project deliverables must be audited by recognised carbon project 
auditors. 
In addition, projects must answer four key questions satisfactorily:  
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• Is the project real? 
• Is the agreed technology installed and working according to plan? 
• Are the carbon calculations unbiased, verifiable and done according to industry-
accepted methods? 
• Is the project making a visible contribution to poverty alleviation in the community? 
The benefit of this type of standard is that it is intuitively easy to understand, rather than 
overly legalistic and jargon-dependent and it is easy to audit for conformance to the 
standard. Because the standard makes sense to people unfamiliar with the carbon market, 
it means that potential buyers have more confidence that they are buying VERs that do 
contribute to poverty alleviation and do reduce GHG emissions (Cartwright, 2012).  
PACE (Promoting Access to Carbon Equity) 
PACE is a Project Proponent and its job is to find suitable poverty alleviation and GHG 
reducing projects, engage with the other stake holders, assist with feasibility studies, assist 
in developing the required documentation (PIN and PDD), find a suitable Project Developer 
and generally carry out the Project Proponent roles as outlined above. In the real world, the 
roles are usually blurred and overlap occurs – this can be damaging and has to be 
addressed right at the beginning, otherwise problems will occur later. 
Credible Carbon 
Credible Carbon is a voluntary carbon registry. It is a separate business entity from PACE, 
but works closely with PACE. Credible Carbon’s role is as outlined above in the Necessary 
role players section. Credible Carbon’s main purpose is to turn the VERs into carbon 
revenue as efficiently as possible and to get as high a price as possible for the underlying 
projects. In the voluntary market, carbon credits are not currently treated as a commodity 
and are not homogeneous as are CERs in the CDM. Rather, VERs are intimately associated 
with their generating projects and buyers do look for particular projects that fit their 
needs. The buyer project selection might involve factors such as: where they are, the type 
of community which will benefit, the type of GHG intervention being considered, who the 
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funder is, who the project role players are and crucially, the credibility of the carbon 
registry and its auditing processes. Buyers would not want to purchase carbon credits that 
could be regarded as ‘green washing’ or that come from a controversial project. So a 
successful carbon registry has to be careful about its selection of projects and the integrity 
of its auditing processes. If it gets these right then it will attract good buyers and achieve 
high carbon prices for its projects. This need for the carbon registry to know the detailed 
origins of its carbon credits is what makes the close connection between PACE and Credible 
Carbon so useful.  
This is the background and the theory, this paper now explores what happened in practice 
with the Umdoni Gel fuel project involving Credible Carbon and PACE. 
Method – Case Study: Umdoni Gel Fuel low Income Housing Project 
The Umdoni Local Municipality, part of the Ugu District 
municipality, is on the east coast of South Africa in the 
province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). It has a population of 
75 000 people in about 20 000 households. 
It is a predominantly poor area, with high unemployment 
and is approximately half rural and half urban. The map in 
Figure 3 shows the Umdoni area highlighted on the lower 
eastern coast. 
Figure 3. Umdoni municipality area map 
Source: (D Morgan & Cartwright, 2011) 
How the Umdoni project started 
The project was not initially conceived as a GHG reduction project which would attract 
carbon revenue, rather it formed part of the Umdoni Municipality’s drive to implement its 
Free Basic Alternative Energy (FBAE) obligations under the South African FBAE Policy 
(DME, 2007). South Africa also has a Free Basic Electricity Policy (DOE, 2003), which 
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provides grid-connected households, which have monthly energy consumption below a 
certain threshold, with an initial amount of free basic electricity, currently this is 
50 kWh/mth in most areas (Ekurhuleni provides 100 kWh). The qualifying monthly energy 
threshold, which is used as a proxy for selecting poor or indigent households, also varies 
across the country – for instance, for Eskom customers in cities it is  < 250 kWh/mth, 
whilst in the Cape Town municipal supply area it is < 450 kWh/mth (Ballantyne, 2012). 
However, 25% (12.5 million) of South Africa’s population are without electricity (DOE, 
2012) and cannot benefit from the FBE. Instead they are covered by the Free Basic 
Alternative Energy Policy (DME, 2007), which aims to provide indigent households with 
alternate forms of energy equivalent to the FBE energy. In the DME Policy document this is 
specified as alternate energy to the value of R 55 per household per month. This amount to 
be escalated by the South African inflation rate plus 1.6% per. Umdoni Municipality, after 
discussions with the proposed Umdoni pilot community of 4 000 households, chose to 
implement this as 7 litres of bio-ethanol gel fuel per household per month for the pilot 
community. KwaZulu-Natal is home to large sugar industries of which bio-ethanol 
production forms part, so this choice appeared to be sensible.  The ethanol stoves were 
funded by the Umdoni Municipality with some contribution from USAid donations. At this 
stage PACE, the future Project Proponent, and Project Preparation Trust (PPT), as a Project 
Developer (which emerged from another entity called Parallax) started to get involved and 
developed the plan to capture carbon revenue for the project. The stakeholders involved 
were: the Umdoni pilot community, the Umdoni Municipality, PPT, PACE and Credible 
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Carbon and its carbon auditors. 
 
Figure 4. Umdoni residents collecting their gel fuel 
Source: (Cartwright, 2012) Credible Carbon Projects 
The process to generate carbon revenue 
The first step was to formalise the project by negotiating and producing a set of documents. 
This was managed by PACE and PPT, working with all the stakeholders. The set of 
documents comprised: The Project Idea Note (PIN), the Umdoni Verification Report, 
Umdoni Audit reports, agreements with the Umdoni Municipality, PPT and the carbon 
auditors. These are described below. 
Project Idea Note – PIN 2008  
This was prepared by Derek Morgan and Anton Cartwright of PACE (Derek Morgan & 
Cartwright, 2008). 
The PIN identified the project name, the partners, location, the 1 July 2008 commencement 
date and the 10 year duration. 
The project was described as comprising 4 000 volunteer households who would be 
supplied with bio-ethanol gel cooking stoves and 7l of bio-ethanol gel per household per 
month. The benefits were described as: 
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• Fewer accidental indoor fires as ethanol gel is safer than paraffin 
• Less air pollution in houses 
• Reduced firewood collection 
• Less money spent on household energy 
• Improved soil quality as more cattle dung would be left on the fields 
• Reduction in GHG emissions as bio-ethanol gel is effectively carbon neutral 
• Opportunities for local businesses for the distribution and sale of the gel fuel 
• Providing a model for replication of similar projects elsewhere 
Part of the implementation would be training for the Umdoni community, working with the 
Umdoni Municipality resources. The training and awareness-raising would include how to 
maintain and use the stoves, the problems caused by unsustainable firewood gathering, 
paraffin fire danger and the health impacts of indoor air pollution. Where the demand for 
the gel stoves exceeds supply, preference would be given to female- and child-headed 
households as these would benefit the most. 
Baseline methodologies, calculations and assumptions 
The CDM Methodology for calculating the carbon emission reductions was the Type 2 –E 
Energy Efficiency and Fuel Switching for Buildings. The advantage of choosing an existing, 
globally endorsed calculation method such as this is that it adds credibility to the VERs and 
saves time and money by not having to develop and prove a new methodology, also carbon 
auditors would be familiar with it and have access to precedents and resources. 
Part of these methodologies involves calculating the “baseline”. This is a forecast of what 
the GHG emissions would have been if the project intervention hadn’t happened. In 
Umdoni’s case the business-as-usual (BAU) baseline assumed that the households would 
have used paraffin if the gel fuel had not been present. The PIN argued that this assumption 
was conservative (in that it would understate the actual GHG emissions in a BAU case, 
which would have used an unknown mixture of wood and dung, some of which is 
unsustainable).  
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This is where problems can arise because one rarely has enough actual information to 
prove the validity of the assumptions and gathering the required information takes time 
and raises the project costs. In the case of Type 1 projects, much time and effort is invested 
into trying to firm up the baseline, with debatable benefits – a lot of paper is generated, but 
one is still left with assumptions about what would have happened in the absence of the 
project. 
The baseline further assumes that households typically boil 22l of water per day, from that 
one can calculate the energy required and the amount of paraffin required to provide that 
energy. This again involves a trade-off between making broad-based assumptions about 
actual heated water quantities and actual paraffin stove efficiencies or doing a full-blown 
research project to get possibly better figures. The calculation finally came up with carbon 
emissions of 1.02 tCO2e/household/year for the paraffin baseline. 
At this stage a questionable assumption was made. This was that because 7l of gel fuel 
typically only lasts a household for seven days a month, and that therefore the VER revenue 
would be used to buy additional 15 l of gel fuel per month, which would then be enough for 
the whole month. Unfortunately, this additional fuel was never bought (due to having to 
wait for the project to roll out, get the audits done, sell the credits and for the community to 
decide what it wanted to do with the money). Consequently, the gel fuel only lasted for a 
quarter of the month, whilst the calculations assumed the whole month, so the carbon 
savings were overstated by a factor of about four.  
In any event, the Umdoni project went ahead with assumed carbon reductions of between 
about 2 600 tCO2e and 3 500 tCO2e per year, depending on how many stoves would 
actually be rolled out. Once the roll-out had progressed for a few years, a carbon auditor 
was engaged to do the first verification report. 
Umdoni Verification Report 2011 
This was prepared by Carl Wesselink and Shehnaaz Moosa (Wesselink & Moosa, 2011). 
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The report was based on a review of the documentation, a site visit and some interviews 
with the key participants and was based on Credible Carbon/PACE’s four key principles, 
shown below with the audit findings: 
• Is the project real and working as planned? – Yes 
• Are the agreed technologies in place and working? – Yes, with some reservations 
about stove maintenance being required (the Umdoni Municipality subsequently 
replaced all the damaged stoves at its own expense). 
• Are the estimated GHG reductions “plausible and unbiased”? – Yes, but the auditors 
proposed a different calculation method, but came to similar figures as in the PIN, 
these being: 2008 512 tCO2e, 2009 1 814 tCO2e, 2010 3 208 tCO2e 
• Can the poverty alleviation impact be readily seen? – Yes. 
So, based on this audit, all looked in order and the baseline calculations, although done in a 
different and simpler way, reinforced the original PIN. 
Baseline methodologies, calculations and assumptions 
Some simple tests done as part of the audit confirmed that the gel fuel does typically last 
for about seven days each month, which confirms the assumption that gel fuel displaces 
about one quarter of a typical household water heating energy consumption. The audit 
then says “if the estimate of 4 tons of emissions (from cooking and water heating) per 
annum per household is accurate, then the displacement of 1 tCO2 per household per year 
through the use of gel fuel is plausible and unbiased, given the relative emissions of gel fuel, 
compared to paraffin.” (Wesselink & Moosa, 2011). However, this author has been unable 
to establish where the four tonnes of emissions per year per household assumption came 
from or whether the quantity of water heated is 22l or 88l – and these are crucial to the 
calculation of the baseline using the methods described above. It will be shown later that 
the second audit, done in 2012, used a third calculation method, that depended on the 
relative amount of paraffin versus gel fuel needed to provide the typical daily energy 
requirement for these households.  
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Following on the 2011 audit, the PIN was updated to reflect the adjusted calculation 
method and the new assumptions, as is normal practice for carbon reduction projects. 
Updated PIN December 2011 
This was prepared by Derek Morgan and Anton Cartwright (D Morgan & Cartwright, 2011). 
The updated PIN reflects the 2011 audit findings and calculations as detailed above, that is 
GHG emission reductions of 5 535 tCO2 for the period 2008 to 2010 plus the other 
community benefits such as reduced fire risk, less time and money spent on gathering and 
buying fuel. The reduced fuel expenditure was estimated at R50 to R70 per household per 
month, which lines up with the FBAE benefit of R55/mth (which should escalate by 
inflation plus 1.6% per year).  
Then, as is good practice in the carbon project world, a second audit was commissioned in 
2012. The intention was to make sure the project is still delivering as promised and update 
the GHG reduction calculations if required. This was done by a different auditor to the 
previous one, also good practice – to get a fresh and possibly different view. 
Umdoni Verification Report 2012 
Prepared by Urban Earth (Mckenzie & Botes, 2012). 
This was a much more detailed audit, covering the period January 2011 to April 2012. 
As in the previous audit, the Credible Carbon/PACE four questions were addressed: 
• Is the project real and working as planned? – Yes 
• Are the agreed technologies in place and working? – Yes, the technology is in place 
and functioning and the households receive 7 l of gel fuel per month which lasts for 
about 7 days 
• Are the estimated GHG reductions “plausible and unbiased”? – “No, the estimates do 
not appear to be reasonable” (This will be explored further below in the baseline 
calculation section) 
• Can the poverty alleviation impact be readily seen? – Yes. 
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Baseline methodologies, calculations and assumptions – paraffin baseline 
By now it was evident that the gel fuel would remain at 7l per household per month and 
that this would typically last for seven days, thus displacing about a quarter of a 
household’s baseline energy, still assumed to be in the form of paraffin. At this stage, the 
new auditors raised the issue of whether it was reasonable to assume that paraffin should 
be used for the BAU baseline calculations. Many of the households could not afford to use 
paraffin exclusively, so this was an important question. The auditors concluded that it was 
reasonable on the basis of “suppressed demand”. 
Suppressed demand 
The reasoning applied is detailed in Appendix One in the audit report (Mckenzie & Botes, 
2012). 
Suppressed demand is a relatively new CDM concept. In simplified terms, suppressed 
demand is an attempt to allow deprived communities to benefit from GHG reductions 
achieved against the higher baseline energy consumption that they would have enjoyed if 
they could have afforded it. The CDM has an elaborate set of rules to govern this what-
might-have-been future and these rules are still in the process of being put to the test of 
practical implementation. So, in the case of Umdoni it appears to be reasonable to assume 
that if they could, they would use fuel other than firewood and dung. The alternatives are, 
in order of preference, if they were affordable:  
• Electricity – discarded because FBAE benefits only apply if the beneficiaries are not 
getting electricity as well. 
• Gas (LPG) – eliminated because gas appliances are more expensive than gel stoves. 
• Paraffin – this is feasible and available so should be used for the suppressed demand 
baseline. 
The auditors then estimated how much paraffin would be displaced by one day of gel fuel, 
and knowing paraffin’s carbon carbon dioxide emission factor, the GHG reduction of the 
avoided paraffin could be calculated. It turned out that roughly one litre of paraffin would 
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last one day as would one litre of gel fuel. So, since the gel fuel lasts for seven days per 
month on average, the emission reduction calculation is simply: “7 litres of paraffin * 12 
month * 2.5421 kgs CO2e per litre of paraffin (DEFRA, 2011) = 214 kgs CO2e per household 
per year.”  (Mckenzie & Botes, 2012) Page 11.  This is in contrast to the original PIN and the 
2011 audit which used 1 tCO2e/household/year.   
It should be noted that there are large uncertainties in this method, for instance: it is 
difficult to determine how long paraffin would actually last a household because it depends 
on how much water they heat, is cooking done at the same time, the amount of other fuels 
being used to supplement the paraffin, the type of paraffin stove and how efficient it is in 
practice and many other factors. Similarly it is difficult to estimate accurately how long the 
gel fuel typically lasts for the same reasons. Because of these problems the auditors also 
considered two other ways of calculating the baseline and the emission reductions. 
Electricity baseline 
This method assumes that under suppressed demand, households would choose electricity 
as their main source of energy and the gel fuel would be displacing the electricity and thus 
reduce emissions to the amount of Eskom’s grid emission factor (assumed to be 0.99 kg 
CO2/kWh). The calculation was done by working out the energy produced by burning the 
annual amount of gel fuel (12 x 7l = 84l per household per year) and applying the Eskom 
grid emission factor. This yields a figure of 290 kg CO2e per household per year (compared 
to the original PIN figure of 1 000 kg CO2e and the paraffin baseline method of 214 kg 
CO2e.). However, as simple as it sounds, this method is also dependent on assumptions 
which are difficult to verify, for instance: the useful energy produced by the gel fuel should 
be compared to the useful energy produced by the electrical heating device. So the relative 
thermal efficiencies of gel fuel and electric kettles need to be taken into account. These are 
all unknown factors in the Umdoni community and are influenced by how the gel fuel 
stoves are operated (vent open or closed), how big the pot of water being heated is, does it 
have its lid on, how much water is heated is used whilst it is hot and how much energy is 
lost through cooling of unused water. Faced with all this uncertainty, all one can do is to 
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make the best assumptions one can with the resources available and try to ensure that they 
are conservative.  
The last methodology considered, and the simplest, was to use the suppressed demand 
principle of “minimum service level” and a baseline of the Free Basic Electricity allowance 
of 50 kWh per month per household.  
Minimum Service Level baseline 
The reasoning is that the FBAE policy is intended to be equivalent to the FBE policy that 
more fortunate households benefit from. Therefore one can argue that the amount of the 
baseline energy that is being displaced is equivalent to the FBE allowance of 50 kWh per 
household per month. The emissions reductions are therefore simply: 
12 months x 50 kWh x 0.99 (the Eskom GEF) = 594 kg CO2e per household per year. 
As the auditors pointed out, this feels wrong, because it results in exactly the same VERs 
regardless of what fuel is being used and how much is being used. Nevertheless, according 
to the report, Steve Thorne, of SouthSouthNorth, who works with the CDM Executive Board 
on suppressed demand issues, feels that the idea has merit. He is discussing this with the 
CDM EB working groups. Time will tell… 
Umdoni case study discussion and conclusions 
Of course each project is different and will encounter different problems and find different 
solutions, so it is necessary to be cautious in generalising from one case. Nevertheless some 
lessons can be derived from the Umdoni project experience. 
• The size of the carbon reductions that can be generated from fuel switching in a 
poor community is small – in the case of Umdoni, the baseline is less than 1 tCO2e 
per household per year for water heating, possibly up to 4 tCO2e/hh/yr if one 
considers their total fuel consumption and not just the water heating part. 
• The VER revenue generated from this is also small, being not more than 
R100/tCO2e, and leading to less than R100/hh/yr for the gel fuel switching. 
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• So, although the Credible Carbon audit costs of around R35 000/yr are an order of 
magnitude less than those of Type 1 markets, they are still high for projects such as 
the Umdoni project. To cover the carbon market costs and project overheads of 
around 30%, a project would need to generate at least 600 tCO2e/year. 
• On the basis of the downward revised VER calculations of 0.2 tCO2e/hh/year, this 
gives 800 tCO2e for Umdoni’s 4 000 households. 
• Therefore, it can be seen that the project scale is critical; for instance if the Umdoni 
pilot could be scaled up to 20 000 households, say, then the net VER revenue 
becomes significant at around R500 000 per year after overheads and audit fees. 
• The VER revenue is directly proportional to the carbon price, which in Credible 
Carbon’s experience has varied between R50/tCO2e and R100/tCO2e for the larger 
transactions. 
• The relatively small scale of the project makes the VER revenue highly sensitive to 
the GHG reduction calculation methods and assumptions and with so little carbon 
revenue available it is not feasible to spend large amounts of time and money 
improving the assumptions, instead one has to be pragmatic and conservative and 
not waste time and money on striving for carbon accounting accuracy. 
• However, although this has not been explored in this paper, the VER price that a 
project can attract is sensitive to the credibility of the VERs in the eyes of the carbon 
customers, so too cursory an audit runs the risk of devaluing the VERs. 
• Rural fuel-switching is an extremely low-intensity way of generating GHG 
reductions, even when exploiting suppressed demand, although switching to clean 
energy does have a disproportionally large effect on community well-being. This is 
due to health benefits through less indoor air pollution, freeing up time through less 
fuel-gathering, less fire risk and many others.  
In spite of the short-comings of a project such as the Umdoni project, the auditors all 
agree that the poverty-alleviating co-benefits make it worthwhile even if the VER 
revenue has been disappointing. 
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General discussion and conclusions 
The CDM Pipeline figures show clearly that the Type 1 carbon market approach (large scale 
projects, complex approval and auditing processes) as embodied in the CDM processes 
have not worked in Africa, with only 3% of the global CDM projects having been registered 
in Africa and only 1% of African CDM projects have got to the CER issuing stage after which 
they can at last be sold. The CDM process takes a long time, up to three years from first 
application to final registration. Along the way there is a high proportion of CDM projects 
falling by the wayside during the extended processes, with only 41% getting to the 
registration step and 13% to the issuance step. Added to this is the complexity and cost of 
getting through the whole process – the CDM transaction costs are typically around 
R500 000 initially and similar amounts for each year for monitoring and verification. 
The Type 1 voluntary market mechanisms, using CDM-like standards such as the Gold 
Standard and the Verified Carbon Standard suffer from similar problems of long lead times 
and high transaction costs. 
The Type 2 markets, which use simpler and less restrictive rules and focus more on 
community benefits, have now emerged and can fill the gap left by the Type 1 markets. 
Meanwhile, having recognised all this, the Type 1 markets are taking steps to try to help the 
developing countries also reap the benefits of generating carbon revenue whilst 
implementing development projects. The next few years will show whether the CDM, GS 
and VCS are able to change to adapt to what Africa needs and has to offer. 
Meanwhile, the smaller, Type 2 voluntary markets and associated standards and registries 
have an opportunity to establish themselves and assist African community development 
carbon projects. 
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Appendix A 





As at 1 July 2012 Number % kCERs % kCERs % Number % kCERs %
Total CDM 4296 100.0% 611280 100.0% 2144237 100.0% 1352 100.0% 815695 100.0%
China 2101 48.9% 390158 63.8% 1273074 59.4% 841 62.2% 573607 70.3%
India 854 19.9% 69133 11.3% 279855 13.1% 348 25.7% 142832 17.5%
Africa 77 1.8% 17711 2.9% 62630 2.9% 15 1.1% 10670 1.3%
Sub-Saharan Africa 55 1.3% 11995 2.0% 40925 1.9% 11 0.8% 2906 0.4%
South Africa 20 0.5% 3498 0.6% 16666 0.8% 8 0.6% 2537 0.3%
Total CDM incl. 
rejections and 
withdrawals 10426 41.2% 13.0%
Source
CDMpipeline UNEP Riso 2012.07.01 from the CD4CDM website, retrieved 25/07/2012
http://cdmpipeline.org/publications/CDMpipeline.xlsx
Registered kCERs by region
kCERs reg. % kCERs Reg.kCERs issued% kCERs iss.
China 390158 64% 573607 70%
India 69133 11% 142832 18%
Africa 17711 3% 10670 1%
ROW 134278 22% 88586 11%
Total CDM 611280 100% 815695 100%
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